Secret-Key Generation using Correlated Sources and Channels by Khisti, Ashish et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
18
35
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
9 J
un
 20
09
1
Secret-Key Generation using Correlated
Sources and Channels
Ashish Khisti, Student Member, IEEE, and Suhas N. Diggavi, Member, IEEE,
and Gregory W. Wornell, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
We study the problem of generating a shared secret key between two terminals in a joint source-
channel setup — the sender communicates to the receiver over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel
and additionally the terminals have access to correlated discrete memoryless source sequences. We
establish lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity. These bounds coincide, establishing
the capacity, when the underlying channel consists of independent, parallel and reversely degraded
wiretap channels. In the lower bound, the equivocation terms of the source and channel components
are functionally additive. The secret-key rate is maximized by optimally balancing the the source
and channel contributions. This tradeoff is illustrated in detail for the Gaussian case where it is also
shown that Gaussian codebooks achieve the capacity. When the eavesdropper also observes a source
sequence, the secret-key capacity is established when the sources and channels of the eavesdropper
are a degraded version of the legitimate receiver. Finally the case when the terminals also have
access to a public discussion channel is studied. We propose generating separate keys from the
source and channel components and establish the optimality of this approach when the when the
channel outputs of the receiver and the eavesdropper are conditionally independent given the input.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many applications in cryptography require that the legitimate terminals have shared secret-
keys, not available to unauthorized parties. Information theoretic security encompasses the
study of source and channel coding techniques to generate secret-keys between legitimate
terminals. In the channel coding literature, an early work in this area is the wiretap channel
model [19]. It consists of three terminals — one sender, one receiver and one eavesdropper.
The sender communicates to the receiver and the eavesdropper over a discrete-memoryless
broadcast channel. A notion of equivocation-rate — the normalized conditional entropy of the
transmitted message given the observation at the eavesdropper, is introduced, and the tradeoff
between information rate and equivocation rate is studied. Perfect secrecy capacity, defined
as the maximum information rate under the constraint that the equivocation rate approaches
the information rate asymptotically in the block length is of particular interest. Information
transmitted at this rate can be naturally used as a shared secret-key between the sender and
the receiver.
In the source coding setup [1], [15], the two terminals observe correlated source sequences
and use a public discussion channel for communication. Any information sent over this
channel is available to an eavesdropper. The terminals generate a common secret-key that is
concealed from the eavesdropper in the same sense as the wiretap channel — the equivocation
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2rate asymptotically equals the secret-key rate. Several multiuser extensions of this problem
have been subsequently studied. See e.g., [5], [6].
Motivated by the above works, we study a problem where the legitimate terminals observe
correlated source sequences and communicate over a wiretap channel and are required to
generate a common secret-key. One application of this setup is sensor networks, where
terminals measure correlated physical processes. It is natural to investigate how these mea-
surements can be used for secrecy. In addition, the sensor nodes communicate over a wireless
channel where an eavesdropper could hear transmission albeit through a different channel.
Another application is secret key generation using biometric measurements [7]. During the
registration phase, an enrollment biometric is stored into a database. To generate a secret key
subsequently, the user is required to provide another measurement of the same biometric. This
new measurement differs from the enrollment biometric due to factors such as measurement
noise and hence can be modeled as a correlated signal. Again when the database is remotely
located, the communication happens over a channel which could be wiretapped.
The secret-key agreement scheme, [1], [15], generates a secret key only using the source
sequences. On the other hand, the wiretap coding scheme [19] generates a secret-key by
exploiting the structure of the underlying broadcast channel. Clearly in the present setup, we
should consider schemes that take into account both the source and channel contributions.
One simple approach is timesharing — for a certain fraction of time the wiretap channel is
used as a (rate limited) transmission channel whereas for the remaining time, a wiretap code
is used to transmit information at the secrecy capacity. However such an approach in general
is sub-optimal. As we will see, a better approach involves simultaneously exploiting both the
source and channel uncertainties at the eavesdropper. As our main result we present lower
and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity. The lower bound is developed by providing a
coding theorem that consists of a combination of a Wyner-Ziv codebook, a wiretap codebook
and a secret-key generation codebook. Our upper and lower bounds coincide, establishing the
secret-key-capacity, when the wiretap channel consists of parallel independent and degraded
channels.
We also study the case when the eavesdropper observes a source sequence correlated with
the legitimate terminals. The secret-key capacity is established when the sources sequence
of the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the sequence of the legitimate receiver and
the channel of the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the channel of the legitimate
receiver. Another variation — when a public discussion channel is available for interactive
communication, is also discussed and the secret-key capacity is established when the channel
output symbols of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are conditionally independent
given the input.
The problem studied in this paper also provides an operational significance for the rate-
equivocation region of the wiretap channel. Recall that the rate-equivocation region captures
the tradeoff between the conflicting requirements of maximizing the information rate to
the legitimate receiver and the equivocation level at the eavesdropper [3]. To maximize
the contribution of the correlated sources, we must operate at the Shannon capacity of the
underlying channel. In contrast, to maximize the contribution of the wiretap channel, we
operate at a point of maximum equivocation. In general, the optimal operating point lies in
between these extremes. We illustrate this tradeoff in detail for the case of Gaussian sources
and channels.
In related work [10], [16], [20] study a setup involving sources and channels, but require
that a source sequence be reproduced at the destination subjected to an equivocation level at
the eavesdropper. In contrast our paper does not impose any requirement on reproduction
3of a source sequence, but instead requires that the terminals generate a common secret
key. A recent work, [18], considers transmitting an independent confidential message using
correlated sources and noisy channels. This problem is different from the secret-key generation
problem, since the secret-key, by definition, is an arbitrary function of the source sequence,
while the message is required to be independent of the source sequences. Independently and
concurrently of our work the authors of [17] consider the scenario of joint secret-message-
transmission and secret-key-generation, which when specialized to the case of no secret-
message reduces to the scenario treated in this paper. While the expression for the achievable
rate in [17] appears consistent with the expression in this paper, the optimality claims in [17]
are limited to the case when either the sources or the channel do not provide any secrecy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem of interest is formally introduced
in section II and the main results of this work are summarized in section III. Proofs of the
lower and upper bound appear in sections IV and V respectively. The secrecy capacity for the
case of independent parallel reversely degraded channels is provided in section VI. The case
when the wiretapper has access to a degraded source and observes transmission through a
degraded channel is treated in section VII while section VIII considers the case when a public
discussion channel allows interactive communication between the sender and the receiver. The
conclusions appear in section IX.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Fig. 1 shows the setup of interest. The sender and receiver communicate over a wiretap
channel and have access to correlated sources. They can interact over a public-discussion
channel. We consider two extreme scenarios: (a) the discussion channel does not exist (b) the
discussion channel has unlimited capacity.
E n c .
d e c
 w. t .
P u b l i c  d i s c u s s i o n  c h a n n e l
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Fig. 1. Secret-key agreement over the wiretap channel with correlated sources. The sender and receiver communicate over
a wiretap channel and have access to correlated sources. They communicate interactively over a public discussion channel
of rate R, if it is available.
The channel from sender to receiver and wiretapper is a discrete-memoryless-channel
(DMC), py ,z |x(·, ·|·). The sender and intended receiver observe discrete-memoryless-multiple-
source (DMMS) pu,v(·, ·) of length N and communicate over n uses of the DMC. We
separately consider the cases when no public discussion is allowed and unlimited discussion
is allowed.
4A. No discussion channel is available
An (n,N) secrecy code is defined as follows. The sender samples a random variable mx 1
from the conditional distribution pmx |uN (·|un). The encoding function fn : Mx × UN → X n
maps the observed source sequence to the channel output. In addition, two key generation
functions k = Kn(Mx,UN) and l = Ln(VN ,Yn) at the sender and the receiver are used
for secret-key generation. A secret-key rate R is achievable with bandwidth expansion factor
β if there exists a sequence of (n, βn) codes, such that for a sequence εn that approaches
zero as n → ∞, we have (i) Pr(k 6= l) ≤ εn (ii) 1nH(k) ≥ R − εn (iii) 1nI(k; zn) ≤ εn. The
secret-key-capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
For some of our results, we will also consider the case when the wiretapper observes a
side information sequence wN sampled i.i.d. pw(·). In this case, the secrecy condition in (iii)
above is replaced with
1
n
I(k; zn,wN) ≤ εn (1)
In addition, for some of our results we will consider the special case when the wiretap
channel consists of parallel and independent channels each of which is degraded.
1) Parallel Channels:
Definition 1: A product broadcast channel is one in which the M constituent subchannels
have finite input and output alphabets, are memoryless and independent of each other, and
are characterized by their transition probabilities
Pr ({ynm, z
n
m}m=1,...,M | {x
n
m}m=1,...,M) =
M∏
m=1
n∏
t=1
Pr(ym(t), zm(t) | xm(t)), (2)
where xnm = (xm(1), xm(2), . . . , xm(n)) denotes the sequence of symbols transmitted on
subchannel m, where ynm = (ym(1), ym(2), . . . , ym(n)) denotes the sequence of symbols ob-
tained by the legitimate receiver on subchannel m, and where znm = (zm(1), zm(2), . . . , zm(n))
denotes the sequence of symbols received by the eavesdropper on subchannel m.

A special class of product broadcast channels, known as the reversely degraded broadcast
channel [8] are defined as follows.
Definition 2: A product broadcast channel is reversely-degraded when each of the M
constituent subchannels is degraded in a prescribed order. In particular, for each subchannel
m, one of xm → ym → zm or xm → zm → ym holds.

Note that in Def. 2 the order of degradation need not be the same for all subchannels, so the
overall channel need not be degraded. We also emphasize that in any subchannel the receiver
and eavesdropper are physically degraded. Our capacity results, however, only depend on the
marginal distribution of receivers in each subchannel2. Accordingly, our results in fact hold for
the larger class of channels in which there is only stochastic degradation in the subchannels.
We obtain further results when the channel is Gaussian.
1The alphabets associated with random variables will be denoted by calligraphy letters. Random variables are denoted by
sans-serif font, while their realizations are denoted by standard font. A length n sequence is denoted by xn.
2However, when we consider the presence of a public-discussion channel and interactive communication, the capacity
does depend on joint distribution py,z|x (·)
52) Parallel Gaussian Channels and Gaussian Sources:
Definition 3: A reversely-degraded product broadcast channel is Gaussian when it takes
the form
ym = xm + nr,m,
zm = xm + ne,m,
m = 1, . . . ,M (3)
where the noise variables are all mutually independent, and nr,m ∼ CN (0, σ2r,m) and ne,m ∼
CN (0, σ2e,m). For this channel, there is also an average power constraint
E
[
M∑
m=1
x2m
]
≤ P.

Furthermore we assume that u and v are jointly Gaussian (scalar valued) random variables,
and without loss of generality we assume that u ∼ N (0, 1) and v = u+s , where s ∼ N (0, S)
is independent of u.
B. Presence of a public discussion channel
We will also consider a variation on the original setup when a public discussion channel
is available for communication. This setup was first introduced in the pioneering works [1],
[15] where the secret-key capacity was bounded for source and channel models. The sender
and receiver can interactively exchange messages on the public discussion channel.
The sender transmits symbols x1, . . . xn at times 0 < i1 < i2 < . . . < in over the wiretap
channel. At these times the receiver and the eavesdropper observe symbols y1, y2, . . . , yn and
z1, z2, . . . , zn respectively. In the remaining times the sender and receiver exchange messages
φt and ψt where 1 ≤ t ≤ k. For convenience we let in+1 = k+1. The eavesdropper observes
both φt and ψt. More formally,
• At time 0 the sender and receiver sample random variables mx and my respectively from
conditional distributions pmx|uN (·|uN) and pmy |vN (·|vN). Note that mx → uN → vN →
my holds.
• At times 0 < t < i1 the sender generates φt = Φt(mx, uN , ψt−1) and the receiver
generates ψt = Ψt(my , vN , φt−1). These messages are exchanged over the public channel.
• At times ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender generates xj = Xj(mx, uN , ψij−1) and sends it over
the channel. The receiver and eavesdropper observe yj ad zj respectively. For these times
we set φij = ψij = 0.
• For times ij < t < ij+1, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender and receiver compute φt =
Φt(mx, u
N , ψt−1) and ψt = Ψt(my , vN , y j, φt−1) respectively and exchange them over
the public channel.
• At time k + 1, the sender and receiver compute k = Kn(mx, uN , ψk) and the receiver
computes l = Ln(my , vN , yn, φk).
We require that for some sequence εn that vanishes as n→∞, Pr(k 6= l) ≤ εn and
1
n
I(k; zn, ψk, φk) ≤ εn. (4)
III. STATEMENT OF MAIN RESULTS
It is convenient to define the following quantities which will be used in the sequel. Suppose
that t is a random variable such that t → u → v , and a and b are random variables such that
6b → a→ x → (y , z) holds and I(y ; b) ≤ I(z ; b). Furthermore define
Rch = I(a; y ), (5a)
R−eq = I(a; y |b)− I(a; z |b) (5b)
Rs = I(t; v ), (5c)
Rwz = I(t; u)− I(t; v ). (5d)
R+eq = I(x ; y | z). (5e)
R+ch = I(x ; y ), (5f)
We establish the following lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate in Section IV
and V respectively.
Lemma 1: A lower bound on the secret-key rate is given by
R−key = βRs +R
−
eq, (6)
where the random variables t, a and b defined above additionally satisfy the condition
βRwz ≤ Rch (7)
and the quantities Rwz, Rs, R−eq and Rch are defined in (5d), (5c), (5b) and (5a) respectively.

Lemma 2: An upper bound on the secret-key rate is given by,
R+key = sup
{(x ,t)}
{
βRs +R
+
eq
}
, (8)
where the supremum is over all distributions over the random variables (x , t) that satisfy
t → u → v , the cardinality of t is at-most the cardinality of u plus one, and
βRwz ≤ R
+
ch. (9)
The quantities Rs, Rwz, R+eq and R+ch are defined in (5c), (5d), (5e) and (5f) respectively.
Furthermore, it suffices to consider only those distributions where (x , t) are independent.

A. Reversely degraded parallel independent channels
The bounds in Lemmas 1 and 2 coincide for the case of reversely degraded channels as
shown in section VI-A and stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secret-key-capacity for the reversely degraded parallel independent chan-
nels in Def. 2 is given by
Ckey = max
{(x1,...,xM ,t)}
{
βI(v ; t) +
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi|zi)
}
, (10)
where the random variables (x1, . . . , xM , t) are mutually independent, t → u → v , and
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi) ≥ β{I(u; t)− I(v ; t)} (11)
Furthermore, the cardinality of t obeys the same bounds as in Lemma 2.

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Fig. 2. An example of independent parallel and reversely degraded Gaussian channels. On the first channel, the eavesdropper
channel is noisier than the legitimate receiver’s channel while on the second channel the order of degradation is reversed.
B. Gaussian Channels and Sources
For the case of Gaussian sources and Gaussian channels, the secret-key capacity can be
achieved by Gaussian codebooks as established in section VI-B and stated below.
Corollary 1: The secret-key capacity for the case of Gaussian parallel channels and Gaus-
sian sources in subsection II-A.2 is obtained by optimizing (10) and (11) over independent
Gaussian distributions i.e., by selecting xi ∼ N (0, Pi) and u = t+d , for some d ∼ N (0, D),
independent of t and
∑n
i=1 Pi ≤ P , Pi ≥ 0, and 0 < D ≤ 1.
CGkey = max
{Pi}Mi=1,D


β
2
log
(
1 + S
D + S
)
+
∑
i:1≤i≤M
σr,i≤σe,i
1
2
log
(
1 + Pi/σ
2
r,i
1 + Pi/σ2e,i
)
 , (12)
where D,P1, . . . , PM also satisfy the following relation:
M∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pi
σ2r,i
)
≥ β
{
1
2
log
(
1
D
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + S
D + S
)}
(13)

C. Remarks
1) Note that the secret-key capacity expression (10) exploits both the source and channel
uncertainties at the wiretapper. By setting either uncertainty to zero, one can recover
known results. When I(u; v ) = 0, i.e., there is no secrecy from the source, the secret-
key-rate equals the wiretap capacity [19]. If I(x ; y |z) = 0, i.e., there is no secrecy from
the channel, then our result essentially reduces to the result by Csiszar and Narayan [5],
that consider the case when the channel is a noiseless bit-pipe with finite rate.
2) In general, the setup of wiretap channel involves a tradeoff between information rate
and equivocation. The secret-key generation setup provides an operational significance
to this tradeoff. Note that the capacity expression (10) in Theorem 1 involves two terms.
The first term βI(t; v ) is the contribution from the correlated sources. In general, this
quantity increases by increasing the information rate I(x ; y ) as seen from (11). The
second term, I(x ; y |z) is the equivocation term and increasing this term, often comes at
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Fig. 3. Tradeoff inherent in the secret-key-capacity formulation. The solid curve is the secret-key-rate, which is the sum
of the two other curves. The dotted curve represents the source equivocation, while the dashed curve represents the channel
equivocation (18). The secret-key-capacity is obtained at a point between the maximum equivocation and maximum rate.
the expense of the information rate. Maximizing the secret-key rate, involves operating
on a certain intermediate point on the rate-equivocation tradeoff curve as illustrated by
an example below.
Consider a pair of Gaussian parallel channels,
y1 = a1x + nr,1, z1 = b1x + ne,1
y2 = a2x + nr,2, z2 = y2
(14)
where a1 = 1, a2 = 2, and b1 = 0.5. Furthermore, u ∼ N (0, 1) and v = u + s , where
s ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of u. The noise variables are all sampled from the CN (0, 1)
distribution and appropriately correlated so that the users are degraded on each channel.
A total power constraint P = 1 is selected and the bandwidth expansion factor β equals
unity.
From Theorem 1,
Ckey = max
P1,P2,D
Req(P1, P2) +
1
2
log
2
1 +D
, (15)
such that,
Rwz(D) =
1
2
log
1
D
−
1
2
log
2
1 +D
(16)
≤
1
2
(
log
(
1 + a21P1
)
+ log(1 + a22P2)
)
, (17)
Req(P1, P2) =
1
2
(
log(1 + a21P1)− log(1 + b
2
1P1)
)
. (18)
Fig. 3 illustrates the (fundamental) tradeoff between rate and equivocation for this
channel, which is obtained as we vary power allocation between the two sub-channels.
We also present the function Rsrc = I(t; v ) which monotonically increases with the rate,
since larger the rate, smaller is the distortion in the source quantization. The optimal
9point of operation is between the point of maximum equivocation and maximum rate
as indicated by the maximum of the solid line in Fig. 3. This corresponds to a power
allocation (P1, P2) ≈ (0.29, 0.71) and the maximum value is Rkey ≈ 0.6719.
D. Side information at the wiretapper
So far, we have focussed on the case when there is no side information at the wiretapper.
This assumption is valid for certain application such as biometrics, when the correlated sources
constitute successive measurements of a person’s biometric. In other applications, such as
sensor networks, it is more realistic to assume that the wiretapper also has access to a side
information sequence.
We consider the setup described in Fig. 1, but with a modification that the wiretapper
observes a source sequence wN , obtained by N− independent samples of a random variable
w . In this case the secrecy condition takes the form in (1). We only consider the case when
the sources and channels satisfy a degradedness condition.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the random variables (u, v ,w) satisfy the degradedness condition
u → v → w and the broadcast channel is also degraded i.e., x → y → z . Then, the secret-
key-capacity is given by
Ckey = max
(x ,t)
{β(I(t; v )− I(t;w)) + I(x ; y |z)} , (19)
where the maximization is over all random variables (t, x) that are mutually independent,
t → u → v → w and
I(x ; y ) ≥ β(I(u; t)− I(v ; t)) (20)
holds. Furthermore, it suffices to optimize over random variables t whose cardinality does
not exceed that of u plus two.

E. Secret-key capacity with a public discussion channel
When public interactive communication is allowed as described in section II-B, we have
the following upper bound on the secret-key capacity.
Theorem 3: An upper bound on the secret-key capacity for source-channel setup with a
public discussion channel is
Ckey ≤ max
px
I(x ; y |z) + βI(u; v ). (21)
The upper bound is tight when channel satisfies either x → y → z or y → x → z .

The presence of a public discussion channels allows us to decouple the source and channel
codebooks. We generate two separate keys — one from the source component using a Slepian-
Wolf codebook and one from the channel component using the key-agreement protocol
described in [1], [15].
The upper bound expression (21) in Theorem 3 is established using techniques similar to
the proof of the upper bound on the secret-key rate for the channel model [1, Theorem 3].
A derivation is provided in section VIII.
Fig. 4 illustrates the contribution of source and channel coding components for the case of
Gaussian parallel channels (14) consisting of (physically) degraded component channels. The
term I(u; v ) is independent of the channel coding rate, and is shown by the horizontal line.
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Fig. 4. Secret-key-rate in the presence of a public discussion channel in the Gaussian example (14). The solid curve is the
secret-key-rate, which is the sum of the two other curves. The horizontal line is the key rate from the source components.
Regardless of the channel rate, the rate is 0.5 bits/symbol. The dashed-dotted curve is the key-rate using the channel I(x ; y |z).
The channel equivocation rate I(x ; y |z) is maximized at the secrecy capacity. The overall key
rate is the sum of the two components. Note that unlike Fig. 3, there is no inherent tradeoff
between source and channel coding contributions in the presence of public discussion channel
and the design of source and channel codebooks is decoupled.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY: CODING THEOREM
We demonstrate the coding theorem in the special case when a = x and b = 0 in Lemma 1.
Accordingly we have that (5a) and (5b) reduce to
Rch = I(x ; y ) (22a)
R−eq = I(x ; y )− I(x ; z) (22b)
The more general case, can be incorporated by introducing an auxiliary channel a→ x and
superposition coding [4] as outlined in Appendix I. Furthermore, in our discussion below we
will assume that the distributions pt|u and px are selected such that, for a sufficiently small
but fixed δ > 0, we have
βRwz = Rch − 3δ. (23)
We note that the optimization over the joint distributions in Lemma 1 is over the region
βRwz ≤ Rch. If the joint distributions satisfy that βRwz = α(Rch − 3δ) for some α < 1, one
can use the code construction below for a bock-length αn and then transmit an independent
message at rate R−eq using a perfect-secrecy wiretap-code. This provides a rate of
α
(
β
α
Rwz +R
−
eq
)
+ (1− α)R−eq = R
−
eq + βRwz,
as required.
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Fig. 5. Source-Channel Code Design for secret-key distillation problem. The source sequence uN is mapped to a codeword
in a Wyner-Ziv codebook. This codeword determines the secret-key via the secret-key codebook. The bin index of the
codeword constitutes a message in the wiretap codebook.
A. Codebook Construction
Our codebook construction is as shown in the Fig. 5.
An intuition behind the codebook construction is first described. The wiretap channel
carries an ambiguity of 2n{I(a;y |b)−I(a;z |b)} at the eavesdropper for each transmitted message.
Furthermore, each message only reveals the bin index. Hence it carries an additional am-
biguity of 2NI(v ;t) codeword sequences. Combining these two effects the total ambiguity is
2n{I(a;y |b)−I(a;z |b)+βI(v ;t)}. Thus a secret-key can be produced at the rate I(a; y |b)−I(a; z |b)+
βI(v ; t). This heuristic intuition is made precise below.
The coding scheme consists of three codebooks: Wyner-Ziv codebook, secret-key code-
book and a wiretap codebook that are constructed via a random coding construction. In our
discussion below we will be using the notion of strong typicality. Given a random variable t,
the set of all sequences of length N and type that coincides with the distribution pt is denoted
by TNt . The set of all sequences whose empirical type is in an ε-shell of pt is denoted by TNt,ε.
The set of jointly typical sequences are defined in an analogous manner. Given a sequence
uN of type TNu , the set of all sequences vN that have a joint type of pu,v () is denoted by
TNu,v(u
N). We will be using the following properties of typical sequences
|TNt,ε| = exp(N(H(t) + oε(1))) (24a)
Pr(tN = tN ) = exp(−N(H(t) + oε(1))), ∀ t
N ∈ TNt,ε (24b)
Pr(tN ∈ TNt,ε) ≥ 1− oε(1), (24c)
where oε(1) is a term that approaches zero as N →∞ and ε→ 0.
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Fig. 6. Equivocation at the eavesdropper through the source-channel codebook. The channel codebook induces an ambiguity
of 2n(I(a;y|b)−I(a;z|b)) among the codeword sequences an when the decoder observes zn. Each sequence an only reveals the
bin index of the Wyner-Ziv codeword. In induces an ambiguity of 2NI(t;v) at the eavesdropper, resulting in a total ambiguity
of 2n(βI(t;v)+I(a;y|b))−I(a;z|b) .
For fixed, but sufficiently small constants δ > 0 and η = δ/β > 0, let,
MWZ = exp(N(Rs − η)) (25a)
NWZ = exp(N(Rwz + 2η)) (25b)
MSK = exp(n(I(x ; z)− δ)) (25c)
NSK = exp(n(βRs +R
−
eq − δ)) (25d)
Substituting (5a)-(5d) and (23) into (25a)-(25d) we have that
Ntot ,MSK ·NSK =MWZ ·NWZ = exp(N(I(t; u) + η)) (26)
We construct the Wyner-Ziv and secret-key codebooks as follows. Randomly and indepen-
dently select Ntot sequences from the set of t−typical sequences TNt . Denote this set T .
Randomly and independently partition this set into the following codebooks3:
• Wyner-Ziv codebook with NWZ bins consisting of MWZ sequences. The jth sequence in
bin i is denoted by tNij,WZ.
• Secret-key codebook with NSK bins consisting of MSK sequences. The jth sequence in
bin i is denoted by tNij,SK.
We define two functions ΦWZ : T → {1, . . . , NWZ} and ΦSK : T → {1, . . . , NSK} as
follows.
Definition 4: Given a codeword sequence tN , define two mappings
1) ΦWZ(tN ) = i, if ∃j ∈ [1,MWZ], such that tN = tNij,WZ.
2) ΦSK(tN) = i, if ∃j ∈ [1,MSK] such that tN = tNij,SK.

The channel codebook consists of NWZ = exp(n(Rch − δ)) sequences xn uniformly and
independently selected from the set of x−typical sequences T nx . The channel encoding func-
tion maps message i into the sequence xni , i.e., Φch : {1, . . . , NWZ} → X n is defined as
Φch(i) = x
n
i .
3As will be apparent in the analysis, the only pairwise independence is required between the codebooks i.e., ∀tN , tˆN ∈ T ,
Pr
`
ΦWZ(t
N ) = ΦWZ(tˆ
N )|ΦSK(t
N ) = ΦSK(tˆ
N )
´
= Pr
`
ΦWZ(t
N ) = ΦWZ(tˆ
N )
´
= 1
NWZ
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B. Encoding
Given a source sequence uN , the encoder produces a secret-key k and a transmit sequence
xN as shown in Fig. 5.
• Find a sequence tN ∈ T such that (uN , tN) ∈ TNut,ε. Let E1 be the even that no such tN
exists.
• Compute φ = ΦWZ(tN) and k = ΦSK(tN ). Declare k as the secret-key.
• Compute xni = Φch(φ), and transmit this sequence over n−uses of the DMC.
C. Decoding
The main steps of decoding at the legitimate receiver are shown in Fig. 5 and described
below.
• Given a received sequence yn, the sender looks for a unique index i such that (xni , yn) ∈
T nxy ,ε. An error event E2 happens if xni is not the transmitted codeword.
• Given the observed source sequence vN , the decoder then searches for a unique index
j ∈ [1,MWZ] such that (tNij,WZ, vN) ∈ TNtv ,ε. An error event E3 is declared if a unique
index does not exist.
• The decoder computes kˆ = ΦSK(tNij,WZ) and declares kˆ as the secret key.
D. Error Probability Analysis
The error event of interest is E = {k 6= kˆ}. We argue that selecting n → ∞ leads to
Pr(E)→ 0.
In particular, note that Pr(E) = Pr(E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3) ≤ Pr(E1) + Pr(E2) + Pr(E3). We argue
that each of the terms vanishes with n→∞.
Recall that E1 is the event that the encoder does not find a sequence in T typical with uN .
Since T has exp(N(I(u; t) + η)) sequences randomly and uniformly selected from the set
TNt , we have that Pr(E1)→ 0.
Since the number of channel codewords equals NWZ = exp(n(I(x ; y )− δ)), and the
codewords are selected uniformly at random from the set T nx ,ε, the error event Pr(E2)→ 0.
Finally, since the number of sequences in each bin satisfies MWZ = exp(N(I(t; v )− η)),
joint typical decoding guarantees that Pr(E3)→ 0.
E. Secrecy Analysis
In this section, that for the coding scheme discussed above, the equivocation at the eaves-
dropper is close (in an asymptotic sense) to Rkey.
First we establish some uniformity properties which will be used in the subsequent analysis.
1) Uniformity Properties: In our code construction ΦWZ satisfies some useful properties
which will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 3: The random variable ΦWZ in Def. 4 satisfies the following relations
1
n
H(ΦWZ) = βRWZ + oη(1) (27a)
1
n
H(tN |ΦWZ) = βI(t; v ) + oη(1) (27b)
1
n
H(ΦWZ|z
n) = I(x ; y )− I(x ; z) + oη(1) (27c)
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where oη(1) vanishes to zero as we take η → 0 and N →∞ for each η.
Proof: Relations (27a) and (27b) are established below by using the properties of typical
sequences (c.f. (24a)-(24c)). Relation (27c) follows from the secrecy analysis of the channel
codebook when the message is ΦWZ. The details can be found in e.g., [19].
To establish (27a), define the function ΓWZ : T → {1, . . . ,MWZ} to identify the position
of the sequence tN ∈ T in a given bin i.e., ΓWZ(tNij,WZ) = j and note that,
Pr(ΓWZ = j,ΦWZ = i) ≤
∑
uN∈Tu,t,η(tNij,WZ)
Pr(uN) (28)
=
∑
uN∈Tu,t,η(tNij,WZ)
exp(−N(H(u) + oη(1))) (29)
= exp(N(H(u|t) + oη(1))) exp(−N(H(u) + oη(1))) (30)
= exp(−N(I(t; u) + oη(1))) (31)
where (28) follows from the construction of the joint-typicality encoder, (29) from (24b)
and (30) from (24a). Marginalizing (28), we have that
Pr(ΦWZ = i) =
MWZ∑
j=1
Pr(ΓWZ = j,ΦWZ = i)
≤MWZ exp(−N(I(t; u) + oη(1)))
= exp(−N(I(t; u)− I(t; v ) + oη(1)))
= exp(−N(RWZ + oη(1))) (32)
Eq. (27a) follows from (32) and the continuity of the entropy function. Furthermore, we
have from (31) that
1
N
H(ΦWZ,ΓWZ) = I(t; u) + oη(1). (33)
The relation (27b) follows by substituting (27a), since
1
N
H(tN |ΦWZ) =
1
N
H(ΓWZ|ΦWZ) =
1
N
H(ΓWZ,ΦWZ) −
1
N
H(ΦWZ) = I(t; v ) + oη(1).
(34)
Lemma 4: The construction of the secret-key codebook and Wyner-Ziv codebook is such
that the eavesdropper can decode the sequence tN if it is revealed the secret-key ΦSK = k in
addition to its observed sequence zn. In particular
1
n
H(tN |zn, k) = oη(1). (35)
Proof: We show that there exists a decoding function g : Zn × {1, 2, . . . , NSK} → T
that such that Pr(tN 6= g(zn, k)) → 0 as n→∞. In particular, the decoding function g(·, ·)
searches for the sequences in the bin associated with k in the secret-key codebook, whose
bin-index in the Wyner-Ziv codebook maps to a sequence xni jointly typical with the received
sequence zn. More formally,
• Given zn, the decoder constructs a the set of indices Ix = {i : (xni , zn) ∈ T nxz ,ε}.
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• Given k , the decoder constructs a set of sequences, S =
{
tNkj,SK : ΦWZ(t
N
kj,SK) ∈ Ix, 1 ≤ j ≤MSK,
}
.
• If S contains a unique sequence tˆN , it is declared to be the required sequence. An error
event is defined as
J = {tˆN 6= tN}
=
{
∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤MSK,ΦWZ(t
N
k,j,SK) ∈ Ix, j 6= j0
}
, (36)
where j0 is the index of the sequence tN in bin k of the secret-key codebook, i.e.,
tNkj0,SK = t
N
.
It suffices to show that Pr(J )→ 0 as n→∞.
We begin by defining the following events:
• The event that the sequence tN /∈ S, which is equivalent to
J0 =
{
ΦWZ(t
N
k,j0,SK
) /∈ Ix
}
.
From (24c) we have that Pr(J0) = oη(1).
• For each j = 1, 2, . . .MSK, j 6= j0 the event Jj that the sequence tNkjSK ∈ S,
Jj =
{
ΦWZ(t
N
k,j,SK) ∈ Ix
}
.
• For each j = 1, 2, . . .MSK, j 6= j0, define the collision event that tNkj,SK and tNkj0,SK belong
to the same bins in the in the Wyner-Ziv codebook
Jcol,j =
{
ΦWZ(t
N
kj,SK) = ΦWZ(t
N
kj0,SK
)
}
.
Now we upper bound the error probability in terms of these events.
Pr(J ) ≤ Pr(J |J c0 ) + Pr(J0)
≤
MSK∑
j=1,j 6=j0
Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ) + oη(1), (37)
Now observe that
Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ) = Pr(Jj ∩ J
c
col,j|J
c
0 ) + Pr(Jj ∩ Jcol,j|J
c
0 ) (38)
≤ Pr(Jj ∩ J
c
col,j|J
c
0 ) + Pr(Jcol,j|J
c
0 )
≤ Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ∩ J
c
col,j) + Pr(Jcol,j|J
c
0 ). (39)
We bound each of the two terms in (39). The first term is conditioned on the event that the
sequences tNkj,SK and tNkj0,SK are assigned to independent bins in the Wyner-Ziv codebook.
This event is equivalent to the event that a randomly selected sequence xN belongs to the
typical set Ix. The error event is bounded as [2]
Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ∩ J
c
col,j) ≤ exp(−n(I(x ; z)− 3ε)). (40)
To upper bound the second term,
Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ) = Pr(Jj) (41)
= exp(−n(βRWZ + 2δ)) (42)
= exp(−n(I(x ; y )− δ)) (43)
where (41) follows from the fact the event J0 is due to the atypical channel behavior and
is independent of the random partitioning event that induces Jj , (42) follows from the fact
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that each sequence is independently assigned to one of exp{n(βRWZ+2δ)} bins in the code
construction and (43) follows via relation (23).
Substituting (43) and (40) into (39), we have
Pr(Jj|J
c
0 ) ≤ exp(−n(I(x ; z)− 3ε)) + exp(−n(I(x ; y )− δ))
≤ exp(−n(I(x ; z)− 4ε)), n ≥ n0, (44)
where we use the fact that I(x ; y ) > I(x ; z) in the last step so that the required n0 exists.
Finally substituting (44) into (37) and using relation (25c) for MSK, we have that
Pr(J ) ≤ exp(−n(δ − 4ε)) + oη(1), (45)
which vanishes with n, whenever the decoding function selects ε < δ/4.
2) Equivocation Analysis: It remains to show that the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper
approaches the secret-key rate as n→∞, which we do below.
H(k|zn) = H(k, tN |zn)−H(tN |zn, k)
= H(tN |zn)−H(tN |zn, k) (46)
= H(tN ,ΦWZ|z
n)−H(tN |zn, k) (47)
= H(tN |ΦWZ, z
n) +H(ΦWZ|z
n)−H(tN |zn, k)
= H(tN |ΦWZ) +H(ΦWZ|z
n)−H(tN |zn, k), (48)
= nβI(t; v ) + n{I(x ; y )− I(x ; z)}+ noη(1) (49)
= n(Rkey + oη(1)), (50)
where (46) and (47) follow from the fact that ΦWZ is a deterministic function of tN and (48)
follows from the fact that tN → ΦWZ → zn holds for our code construction. and (49) step
follows from (27b) and (27c) in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
V. PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND (LEMMA 2)
Given a sequence of (n,N) codes that achieve a secret-key-rate Rkey, there exists a sequence
εn, such that εn → 0 as n→∞, and
1
n
H(k|yn, vN) ≤ εn (51a)
1
n
H(k|zn) ≥
1
n
H(k)− εn. (51b)
We can now upper bound the rate Rkey as follows.
nRkey = H(k)
= H(k|yn, vN) + I(k; yn, vN)
≤ nεn + I(k; y
n, vN)− I(k; zn) + I(k; zn) (52)
≤ 2nεn + I(k; y
n, vN)− I(k; zn) (53)
= 2nεn + I(k; y
n)− I(k; zn) + I(k; vN |yn)
≤ 2nεn + I(k; y
n)− I(k; zn) + I(k, yn; vN) (54)
where (52) and (53) follow from (51a) and (51b) respectively.
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Now, let J be a random variable uniformly distributed over the set {1, 2, . . . , N} and
independent of everything else. Let ti = (k, yn, vNi+1, ui−11 ) and t = (k, yn, vNJ+1, uJ−11 , J), and
vJ be a random variable that conditioned on J = i has the distribution of pvi . Note that since
vN is memoryless, vJ is independent of J and has the same marginal distribution as v . Also
note that t → uJ → vJ holds.
I(k, yn; vN) =
n∑
i=1
I(k, yn; vi|v
n
i+1)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(k, yn, vni+1; vi)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(k, yn, vni+1, u
i−1
1 ; vi)
= NI(k, yn, vnJ+1, u
J−1
1 ; vJ |J)
= NI(k, yn, vnJ+1, u
J−1
1 , J ; vJ)− I(J ; vJ)
= NI(t; v ) (55)
where (55) follows from the fact that vJ is independent of J and has the same marginal
distribution as v .
Next, we upper bound I(k; yn) − I(k; zn) as below. Let pxi denote the channel input
distribution at time i and let pyi,zi denote the corresponding output distribution. Let px =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pxi and let py and pz be defined similarly.
I(k; yn)− I(k; zn) ≤ I(k; yn|zn)
≤ I(xn; yn|zn) (56)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(xi; yi|zi) (57)
≤ nI(x ; y |z), (58)
where (56) follows from the Markov condition k → xn → (yn, zn) and (57) follows from
the fact that the channel is memoryless and (58) follows from Jensen’s inequality since the
term I(x ; y |z) is concave in the distribution px (see e.g., [13, Appendix-I]).
Combining (58) and (55) we have that
Rkey ≤ I(x ; y |z) + βI(v ; t), (59)
thus establishing the first half of the condition in Lemma 2. It remains to show that the
condition
β{I(t; u)− I(t; v )} ≤ I(x ; y )
is also satisfied. Since uN → xn → yn holds, we have that
nI(x ; y ) ≥ I(xn; yn) (60)
≥ I(uN ; yn) (61)
≥ I(uN ; yn, k)− I(vN ; yn, k)− nεn, (62)
18
where the last inequality holds, since
I(uN ; k|yn)− I(vN ; yn, k) = −I(vN ; yn) + I(uN ; k|yn)− I(vN ; k|yn)
≤ I(uN ; k|yn)− I(vN ; k|yn)
= H(k|yn, vN)−H(k|yn, uN)
≤ nεn,
where the last step holds via (51a) and the fact that H(k|yn, uN) ≥ 0.
Continuing (62), we have
nI(x ; y ) ≥ I(uN ; yn, k)− I(vN ; yn, k)− nεn (63)
=
N∑
i=1
{I(ui; y
n, k, ui−11 v
n
i+1)− I(vi; y
n, k, ui−11 v
n
i+1)}+ nεn (64)
= N{I(uJ ; y
n, k, uJ−11 v
n
J+1|J)− I(vJ ; y
n, k, uJ−11 v
n
J+1|J) + εn}
= N{I(uJ ; t)− I(vJ ; t) + I(vJ ; J)− I(uJ ; J) + εn}
= N{I(u; t)− I(v ; t) + εn} (65)
where (64) follows from the well known chain rule for difference between mutual information
expressions (see e.g., [9]), (65) again follows from the fact that the random variables vJ and
uJ are independent of J and have the same marginal distribution as v and u respectively.
The cardinality bound on t is obtained via Caratheordory’s theorem and will not be
presented here.
Finally, since the upper bound expression does not depend on the joint distribution of (t, x),
it suffices to optimize over those distributions where (t, x) are independent.
VI. REVERSELY DEGRADED CHANNELS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
First we show that the expression is an upper bound on the capacity. From Lemma 2, we
have that
Ckey ≤ max
(x ,t)
I(x ; y |z) + βI(t; v ),
where we maximize over those distributions where (x , t) are mutually independent, t → u →
v , and
I(x ; y ) ≥ β(I(t; u)− I(t; v )).
For the reversely degraded parallel independent channels, note that
I(x ; y ) ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi)
I(x ; y |z) ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi|zi),
with equality when (x1, . . . , xM) are mutually independent. Thus it suffices to take (x1, . . . , xM)
to be mutually independent, which establishes that the proposed expression is an upper bound
on the capacity.
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For achievability, we propose a choice of auxiliary random variables (a, b) in Lemma 1,
such that the resulting expression reduces to the capacity. In particular, assume without loss
in generality that for the first P channels we have that xi → yi → zi and for the remaining
channels we have that xi → zi → yi. Let a = (x1, x2, . . . , xM) and b = (xP+1, . . . , xM) where
the random variables {xi} are mutually independent. It follows from (5a) and (5b) that
Rch =
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi) (66)
R−eq =
P∑
i=1
I(xi; yi|zi) =
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi|zi), (67)
where the last equality follows since for xi → zi → yi, we have that I(xi; yi|zi) = 0.
Substituting in (6) and (7) we recover the capacity expression.
B. Gaussian Case (Corollary 1)
For the Gaussian case we show that Gaussian codebooks achieve the capacity as in Corol-
lary 1.
Recall that the capacity expression involves maximizing over random variables x = (x1, . . . , xM),
and t → u → v ,
Ckey =
∑
i
I(xi; yi|zi) + βI(t; v ) (68)
subjected to the constraint that E[∑Mi=1 x2i ] ≤ P and∑
i
I(xi; yi) ≥ β{I(t; u)− I(t; v )}. (69)
Let us first fix the distribution px and upper bound the objective function (68). Let R ,
1
β
∑M
i=1 I(xi; yi) and v = u + s , where s ∼ N (0, S) is independent of u. We will use the
conditional entropy power inequality
exp(2h(u + s|t)) ≥ exp(2h(u|t)) + exp(2h(s)) (70)
for any pair of random variables (t, u) independent of s . The equality happens if (u, t) are
jointly Gaussian.
Note that we can express (69) as
R + h(v )− h(u) ≥ h(v |t)− h(u|t) (71)
= h(u + s|t)− h(u|t) (72)
≥
1
2
log (exp(2h(u|t)) + 2pieS)− h(u|t) (73)
Letting
h(u|t)) =
1
2
log 2pieD, (74)
we have that
D ≥
S
exp(2(R + h(v )− h(u)))− 1
. (75)
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Rearranging we have that
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yi) ≥
β
2
[
log
(
1 +
S
D
)
− log(1 + S)
]
. (76)
The term I(t; v ) in the objective function (68) can be upper bounded as
I(t; v ) = h(v )− h(v |t)
= h(v )− h(u + s|t)
≤ h(v )−
1
2
log(exp(2h(u|s)) + 2pieS) (77)
=
1
2
log
1 + S
D + S
(78)
where (77) follows by the application of the EPI (70) and (78) follows via (74). Thus the
objective function (68) can be expressed as
Ckey =
∑
i
I(xi; yi|zi) +
β
2
log
1 + S
D + S
, (79)
where D satisfies (75).
It remains to show that the optimal x has a Gaussian distribution. Note that the set of
feasible distributions for x is closed and bounded and hence an optimum exists. Also if px
is any optimum distribution, we can increase both R and I(xi; yi|zi) by replacing px with a
Gaussian distribution (see e.g., [14]) with the same second order moment. Since the objective
function is increasing in both these terms, it follows that a Gaussian px also maximizes the
objective function (68).
VII. SIDE INFORMATION AT THE WIRETAPPER
We now provide an achievability and a converse for the capacity stated in Theorem 2
A. Achievability
Our coding scheme is a natural extension of the case when w = 0.
Since we are only considering degraded channels note that Rch and R−eq in (5a) and (5b)
are defined as
Rch = I(x ; y ) (80)
R−eq = I(x ; y )− I(x ; z) = I(x ; y |z). (81)
Furthermore, we replace Rs in (5c) with
Rs = I(t; v )− I(t;w) (82)
and the secret-key rate in (6) is
RLB = β{I(t; v )− I(t;w)}+ I(x ; y |z). (83)
The construction of Wyner-Ziv codebook and wiretap codebook in Fig. 5 is as discussed
in section IV-A, IV-B,and IV-C. The Wyner-Ziv codebook consists of ≈ 2NI(t;u) codeword
sequences sampled uniformly from the set TNt . These sequences are uniformly and randomly
partitioned into ≈ 2N{I(t;u)−I(t;v)} bins so that there are ≈ 2NI(t;v) sequences in each bin.
The bin index of a codeword sequence, ΦWZ, forms a message for the wiretap codebook as
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before. The construction of the secret key codebook is modified to reflect the side informa-
tion sequence at the eavesdropper. In particular we construct the secret-key codebook with
parameters
MSK = exp (n(I(x ; z) + βI(w ; t))− δ) (84)
NSK = exp
(
n(βRs +R
−
eq − δ)
) (85)
and Rs is defined in (82).
B. Secrecy Analysis
We show that the equivocation condition at the eavesdropper (1) holds for the code con-
struction. This is equivalent to showing that
1
n
H(k|wN , zn) = β(I(t; v )− I(t;w)) + I(x ; y |z) + oη(n), (86)
which we will now do.
We first provide an alternate expression for the left hand side in (86).
H(k|wN , zn) = H(k, tN |wN , zn)−H(tN |k,wN , zn) (87)
= H(tN |wN , zn)−H(tN |k,wN , zn)
= H(tN ,ΦWZ|w
N , zn)−H(tN |k,wN , zn) (88)
= H(ΦWZ|w
N , zn) +H(tN |ΦWZ,w
N)−H(tN |k,wN , zn) (89)
where (88) follows from the fact that ΦWZ is a deterministic function of tN , while (89) follows
from the fact that tN → (wN ,ΦWZ)→ zn forms a Markov chain. The right hand side in (86)
is established by showing that
1
n
H(ΦWZ|w
N , zn) ≥ I(x ; y |z) + oη(1) (90a)
1
n
H(tN |ΦWZ,w
N) = β(I(t; v )− I(t;w)) + oη(1) (90b)
1
n
H(tN |k,wN , zn) = oη(1). (90c)
To interpret (90a), recall that ΦWZ is the message to the wiretap codebook. The equivocation
introduced by the wiretap codebook 1
n
H(ΦWZ|zn) equals I(x ; y |z). Eq. (90a) shows that if
in addition to zn, the eavesdropper has access to wN , a degraded source, the equivocation
still does not decrease (except for a negligible amount). The intuition behind this claim is
that since the bin index ΦWZ is almost independent of vN (see Lemma 5 below), it is also
independent of wN due to the Markov condition.
Eq. (90b) shows that the knowledge of wN reduces the list of tN sequences in any bin
from exp(N(I(t; v ))) to exp(N(I(t; v ) − I(t;w))), while (90c) shows that for the code
construction, the eavesdropper, if revealed the secret-key, can decode tN with high probability.
To establish (90a),
1
n
H(ΦWZ|w
N , zn) ≥
1
n
H(ΦWZ|z
n, vN) (91)
=
1
n
H(ΦWZ|z
n)−
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N |zn)
≥ I(x ; y |z) + oη(1)−
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N |zn), (92)
≥ I(x ; y |z) + oη(1)−
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N), (93)
22
where (91) follows from the fact that wN → vN → (ΦWZ, zn), (92) from Lemma 3 and (93)
from the fact that vN → ΦWZ → zn so that
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N |zn) ≤
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N). (94)
Thus we need to show the following.
Lemma 5:
1
n
I(ΦWZ; v
N) ≤ oη(1). (95)
Proof: From Lemma 3 note that
1
N
H(ΦWZ) = I(t; u)− I(t; v ) + oη(1)
and hence we need to show that
1
N
H(ΦWZ|v
N) = I(t; u)− I(t; v ) + oη(1)
as we do below.
1
N
H(ΦWZ|v
N) =
1
N
H(ΦWZ, t
N |vN)−
1
N
H(tN |vN ,ΦWZ)
=
1
N
H(tN |vN) + oη(1) (96)
Where (96) follows since each bin has MWZ = exp (N(I(t; v )− η)) sequences, (from stan-
dard joint typicality arguments) we have that
1
N
H(tN |vN ,ΦWZ) = oη(1). (97)
Finally by substituting a = v , b = u and c = t and R = I(t; u) + η, in Lemma 6 in
Appendix II we have that
1
N
H(tN |vN) = I(t; u)− I(t; v ) + oη(1).
This completes the derivation of (95).
To establish (90b), we again use Lemma 6 in Appendix II, with a = w , b = u and c = t
and R = I(t; v )−η. Finally, to establish (90c), we construct a decoder as in section IV-E that
searches for a sequence tNkj such that ΦWZ(tNkj) ∈ Ix and which is also jointly typical with
wN . Since there are exp{n(βI(w ; t)+ I(x ; z)− η)} sequences in the set, we can show along
the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 4 that tN can be decoded with high probability
given (k, zn,wN). The details will be omitted.
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C. Converse
Suppose there is a sequences of (n,N) codes that achieves a secret key (k) rate of R, and
β = N/n. Then from Fano’s inequality,
H(k|yn, vN) ≤ nεn,
and from the secrecy constraint.
1
n
I(k; zn,wN) ≤ εn.
Combining these inequalities, we have that,
nRkey ≤ I(k; y
n, vN)− I(k; zn,wN) + 2nεn
≤ I(k; yn, vN | zn,wN) + 2nεn
≤ h(yn | zn) + h(vN | wN )− h(yn | zn,wN , k)− h(vN | yn, zn,wN , k) + 2nεn
≤ h(yn | zn) + h(vN | wN )− h(yn | zn,wN , k, xn)− h(vN | yn, zn,wN , k, ) + 2nεn
= h(yn | zn) + h(vN | wN)− h(yn | zn, xn)− h(vN | yn, zn,wN , k, ) + 2nεn (98)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(xi; yi | zi) + h(v
N | wN)− h(vN |yn,wN , k) + 2nεn (99)
≤ nI(x ; y | z) + h(vN | wN)− h(vN |yn,wN , k) + 2nεn (100)
where the (98) follows from the fact that (wN , k)→ (zn, xn)→ yn, and (99) follows from the
Markov condition zn → (yn,wn, k) → vN that holds for the degraded channel, while (100)
follows from the fact that I(x ; y |z) is a concave function of pxi (see e.g., [13, Appendix-I])
and we select px(·) = 1n
∑n
i=1 pxi(·). Now, let ti = (k, uni+1v i−1, yn), J be a random variable
uniformly distributed over the set [1, 2, . . . n] and t = (J, k, unJ+1vJ−1, yn) we have that
h(vN |yn,wN , k) =
N∑
i=1
h(vi|v
i−1, yn,wN , k)
≥
N∑
i=1
h(vi|v
i−1, yn,wN , uNi+1, k)
=
N∑
i=1
h(vi|v
i−1, yn,wi, u
N
i+1, k) (101)
= N · h(vJ |t,wJ)
where we have used the fact that (w i−1,wNi+1) → (v i−1, yn,wi, uNi+1, k) → vi which can be
verified as follows
p
(
vi | wi,w
i−1,wNi+1, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k
)
=
∑
ui=u
p
(
vi | wi, ui = u,w
i−1,wNi+1, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k
)
p
(
ui = u | wi,w
i−1,wNi+1, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k
)
=
∑
ui=u
p (vi | wi, ui = u) p
(
ui = u | wi, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k
) (102)
=p
(
vi | wi, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k
)
,
24
where (102) follows from the fact that since the sequence vN is sampled i.i.d. , we have that
vi → (ui,wi)→ (w
i−1,wNi+1, v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n, k)
and since u → v → w , it follows that
ui → (v
i−1, uNi+1, y
n,wi, k)→ (w
i−1,wNi+1).
Since, vJ and wJ are both independent of J , we from (100) that
Rkey ≤ I(x ; y |z) + βI(t; v |w) + 2εn.
Finally, using the steps between (63)-(65) as in the converse for the case when w = 0, we
have that
I(x ; y ) ≥ β(I(t; u)− I(t; v )), (103)
which completes the proof.
VIII. PUBLIC DISCUSSION CHANNEL
We establish the upper bound on the secret key capacity in the presence of interactive
communication over a public discussion channel.
Proof:
First from Fano’s inequality we have the following,
nR = H(k) (104)
= H(k|l) + I(k; l) (105)
≤ nεn + I(k; l) (106)
where the last inequality follows from Fano’s inequality. Also from the secrecy constraint we
have that
1
n
I(k;φk, ψk, zn) ≤ εn,
which results in the following
nR ≤ nεn + I(k; l , ψ
k, φk, zn) (107)
≤ 2nεn + I(k; l |ψ
k, φk, zn) (108)
≤ 2nεn + I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , yn|ψk, φk, zn), (109)
where the last step follows from the data-processing inequality since k = K(mx, uN , ψk) and
l = L(my , v
N , yn, φk).
Using the chain rule, we have that
I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , yn|ψk, φk, zn) (110)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , yn, ψk, φk, zn)− I(mx, u
N ;ψk, φk, zn) (111)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , ψi1−1, φi1−1) +
n∑
j=1
Fj +Gj
− I(mx, u
N ;ψi1−1, φi1−1)−
n∑
j=1
Fˆj + Gˆj , (112)
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where for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n we define Fj = I(mx, uN ; yj, zj|my , vN , y j−1, z j−1, φij−1, ψij−1),
Gj = I(mx, u
N ;φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|my , v
N , y j, z j, φij−1, ψij−1), and Fˆj =
I(mx, u
N ; zj |z j−1, ψij−1, φij−1), Gˆj = I(mx, uN ;φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|z
j, φij−1, ψij−1).
We now bound the expression in (112). First note that
I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , ψi1−1, φi1−1)− I(mx, u
N ;ψi1−1, φi1−1)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N |ψi1−1, φi1−1)
≤ I(mx, u
N , ψi1−1;my , v
N |ψi1−2, φi1−1)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N |ψi1−2, φi1−1)
≤ I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , φi1−1|ψ
i1−2, φi1−2)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N |ψi1−2, φi1−2)
where the third and fifth step follow from the fact that ψi1−1 = Ψi1−1(mx, uN , φi1−2) and
φi1−1 = Φi1−1(my , v
N , ψi1−2). Recursively continuing we have that
I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N |ψi1−1, φi1−1) ≤ I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N) = I(uN ; vN) = NI(u; v ) (113)
where we use the facts that mx → uN → vN → my and that (uN , vN) are discrete and
memoryless.
Also note that
Fj − Fˆj (114)
= I(mx, u
N ; yj, zj |my , v
N , y j−1, z j−1, φij−1, ψij−1)− I(mx, u
N ; zj|z
j−1, ψij−1, φij−1)
= H(yj, zj |my , v
N , y j−1, z j−1, φij−1, ψij−1)−H(yj, zj|my , v
N , y j−1, z j−1, φij−1, ψij−1,mx, u
N)
−H(zj|z
j−1, ψij−1, φij−1) +H(zj|z
j−1, ψij−1, φij−1,mx, u
N)
= H(yj, zj |my , v
N , y j−1, z j−1, φij−1, ψij−1)−H(yj, zj|xj)−H(zj|z
j−1, ψij−1, φij−1) +H(zj |xj)
(115)
≤ H(yj|z
j, ψij−1, φij−1)−H(yj|zj, xj)
≤ I(xj; yj|zj), (116)
where (115) follows from the fact that xj = Xj(mx, uN , ψij−1) and that since the channel
is memoryless (mx,my , uN , vN , φij−1, ψij−1, y j−1, z j−1) → xj → (yj, zj) holds. The last two
steps follow from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
Finally to upper bound Gj − Gˆj ,
Gj − Gˆj
= I(mx, u
N ;φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|my , v
N , y j, z j, φij−1, ψij−1)
− I(mx, u
N ;φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|z
j, φij−1, ψij−1)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j, φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|z
j, φij−1, ψij−1)
− I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|z j, φij−1, ψij−1)−I(mx, u
N;φij+1, . . . , φij+1−1, ψij+1, . . . , ψij+1−1|z
j , φij−1,ψij−1)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij+1−1, ψij+1−1, z j)− I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij−1, ψij−1, z j)
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Furthermore since φij+1−1 = Φij+1−1(mx, uN , ψij+1−2) and ψij+1−1 = Ψij+1−1(my , vN , φij+1−2)
we have that
I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij+1−1, ψij+1−1, z j)
≤ I(mx, u
N , φij+1−1;my , v
N , y j|φij+1−2, ψij+1−1, z j)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij+1−2, ψij+1−1, z j)
≤ I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j, ψij+1−1|φ
ij+1−2, ψij+1−2, z j)
= I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j, |φij+1−2, ψij+1−2, z j)
Continuing this process we have that
I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij+1−1, ψij+1−1, z j) ≤ I(mx, u
N ;my , v
N , y j|φij−1, ψij−1, z j)
and thus
Gj − Gˆj ≤ 0. (117)
Substituting (113), (116) and (117) into (112) we have that
nR ≤
n∑
j=1
I(xj; yj|zj) +NI(u; v ) + 2nεn (118)
≤ max
px
nI(x ; y |z) +NI(u; v ) + 2nεn (119)
thus yielding the stated upper bound.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a secret-key agreement technique that harnesses uncertainties
from both sources and channels. Applications of sensor networks and biometric systems
motivated this setup.
We first consider the case when the legitimate terminals observe a pair of correlated sources
and communicate over a wiretap channel for generating secret keys. The secret-key capacity is
bounded by establishing upper and lower bounds. The lower bound is established by providing
a coding theorem that combines ideas from source and channel coding. Its optimality is
established when the wiretap channel consists of parallel, independent and degraded channels.
The lower bound in general involves us to operate at a point on the wiretap channel that
balances the contribution of source and channel contributions and this illustrated for the
Gaussian channels.
In addition we also establish the capacity when the wiretapper has access to a source
sequence which is a degraded version of the source sequence of the legitimate receiver. Fur-
thermore the case when a public discussion channel is available for interactive communication
is also studied and an upper bound on the secret-key capacity is provided. For the practically
important case, when the wiretap channel consists of “independent noise” for the legitimate
receiver and the discussion channel allows us to separately generate keys from source and
channel components without loss of optimality.
In terms of future work, there can be many fruitful avenues to explore for secret-key distilla-
tion in a joint-source-channel setup. One can consider multi-user extensions of the secret-key
generation problem along the lines of [6] and also consider more sophisticated channel models
such as the compound wiretap channels, MIMO wiretap channels and wiretap channels with
feedback and/or side information. Connections of this setup to wireless channels, biometric
systems and other applications can also be interesting.
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APPENDIX I
EXTENSION OF LEMMA 1 TO GENERAL (a, b)
We extend the coding theorem in section IV for Lemma 1 to the case of general (a, b).
We focus on the case when a = x . The general case then follows by further considering the
auxiliary channel a → x , sampling the codewords from the typical set T na and then passing
each symbol of an through an auxiliary channel px |a(·).
Our extension involves using a superposition code as discussed below. Let us define Ra =
I(x ; y |b) and Rb = I(b; y ). Since b → x → y , we have that Rb + Ra = I(x ; y ). We
first generate a codebook Cb with Nb = exp (n(Rb − δb)) sequences sampled uniformly
from the set T nb . For each sequence bni ∈ Cb, we generate a codebook Ca(bni ) by selecting
Na = exp(n(I(x ; y |b)− δa)) sequences uniformly at random from the set T nx ,b(bni ).
Select δa > 0 and δb > 0 as arbitrary constants such that δa + δb = δ, which satisfies (23).
Note that we have NWZ = Na·Nb. We define an encoding functions: ΦWZ,b : {1, 2, . . . , Nb} →
Cb and ΦiWZ,a : {1, 2, . . . , Na} → Ca(bni ) as a mapping from the messages to respective
codewords in the codebooks.
The construction of the Wyner-Ziv codebook and the secret-key codebook is via random
partitioning along the lines in section IV-A — the constants MWZ and NWZ are as given
in (25a) and (25b) respectively while
MSK = exp (n(I(b; y ) + I(x ; z |b)− δ)) , (120a)
NSK = exp (n(βI(t; v ) + I(x ; y |b)− I(x ; z |b)− δ)) . (120b)
The encoding function is defined as follows: given a sequence uN , as in section IV-B, a
jointly typical sequence tN ∈ T is selected and the bin index and secret-key are computed
via the mappings ΦWZ(tN ) and ΦSK(tN) respectively in Def. 4. The bin index is split into
two indices Φa ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Na} and Φb ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, which form messages for the channel
codebooks constructed above and the resulting sequence xn is transmitted.
The decoder upon observing yn searches for sequences bni ∈ Cb and xn ∈ Ca(bni ) that are
jointly typical i.e., (yn, xn, bni ) ∈ T ny ,x ,b,η. By our choice of Nb and Na this succeeds with
high probability. It then reconstructs the bin index ΦWZ and searches for a sequence tN ∈ T
that lies in this bin and is jointly typical with vN . As in section IV-C, this step succeeds with
high probability. The secret-key is then computed as kˆ = ΦSK(tN).
We need to show the secrecy condition that
1
n
H(k|zn) = {I(x ; y |b)− I(x ; z |b)}+ βI(t; v ) + oη(1). (121)
By expressing H(k|zn) as in (48) in section IV-E.2
H(k|zn) = H(ΦWZ|z
n) +H(tN |ΦWZ)−H(t
N |k, zn). (122)
For the superposition codebook, since ΦWZ is the transmitted message we have from [4]
1
n
H(ΦWZ|z
n) = I(x ; y |b)− I(x ; z |b) + oη(1), (123)
and from (27b) in Lemma 3,
1
N
H(tN |ΦWZ) = I(t; v ) + oη(1). (124)
To show that
1
N
H(tN |zn, k) = oη(1) (125)
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we use a decoder analogous to that in the proof of Lemma 4 in Section IV-E. Upon observing
zn, the decoder searches for a sequence bni ∈ Cb that is jointly typical. This event succeeds
with high probability since I(b; z) ≥ I(b; y ) = Rb. Let the set of conditionally typical
sequences xn be
Ix = {j|x
n
j ∈ Cb(b
n
i ), (x
n
j , z
n) ∈ T nx,z,η}. (126)
The eavesdropper searches for all sequences tNkj,SK such that Φa(tNkj,SK) ∈ Ix and Φb(tNkj,SK) =
i. Since the number of sequences tNkj,SK is MSK = exp (n(I(x ; z |b) + I(b; y )− δ)), along the
lines of Lemma 4, it follows that the codeword sequence is decoded with high probability.
Note that (121) follows from (122), (123), (124) and (125).
APPENDIX II
CONDITIONAL ENTROPY LEMMA
Lemma 6: Suppose that the random variables a, b, and c are finite valued with a joint
distribution pa,b,c(·) that satisfies a → b → c . Suppose that a set Cc is selected by drawing
exp(NR) sequences {cNi } uniformly and at random from the set of typical sequences TNc
where R < H(c). Suppose that the pair of length-N sequences (aN , bN) are drawn i.i.d. from
the distribution pa,b and a sequence cNi ∈ Cc is selected uniformly at random from the set of
all possible sequences such that (cNi , bN ) ∈ TNcb,η . Then for R > I(c; a), we have that
1
N
H(cNi |a
N) = R− I(c; a) + oη(1), (127)
where the term oη(1) vanishes to zero as N →∞ and η → 0.
Proof: From (24c), for all pair of sequences (aN , bN), except a set whose probability is
oη(1), we have that (aN , bN) ∈ TNab,η. For each such typical pair, since a → b → c and
(bN , cNi ) ∈ T
N
bc,η from the Markov Lemma it follows that (aN , cNi ) ∈ TNac,η .
To establish (127) it suffices to show that for all sequences aN ∈ TNa,η, except a set whose
probability is at most oη(1)
Pr(cN = cNi |a
N = aN) = exp(−N(R − I(c; a) + oη(1))). (128)
The expression in (127) then immediately follows by due to the continuity of the log function.
To establish (128),
Pr(cN = cNi |a
N = aN ) =
p(aN |cNi ) Pr(c
N = cni )
p(aN )
. (129)
From property (24b) of typical sequences p(aN) = exp(−N(H(a) + oη(1))), p(aN |cNi ) =
exp(−N(H(a|c) + oη(1))) and since the sequence cN is uniformly selected from 2nR se-
quences, we have that Pr(cN = cNi ) = exp(−NR). Substituting these quantities in (129)
establishes (128).
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